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EVOLVING LAW AND POLICY FOR FRESHWATER
ECOSYSTEM SERVICE MARKETS
MARTIN W. DOYLE* & TODD BENDOR**†
INTRODUCTION
Humans have altered freshwater ecosystems worldwide.1 With the
dramatic increase in irrigation, water storage projects, and land utilization
through the twentieth century, the scale of environmental conversion has
grown to influence fundamental biophysical processes including fundamen-
tal changes to the water cycle, cycling of elements (e.g., carbon, nitrogen,
and phosphorus), species composition, and climate.2 These transforma-
tions have raised questions about the possibility of conserving and possibly
restoring damaged freshwater ecosystems.3 While environmental conser-
vation and restoration efforts have historically focused on recovering im-
portant organisms (flora and fauna), recent scientific and policy endeavors
have centered on sustaining the services produced by ecosystems and their
components.4 One way of accomplishing this is through the creation and
use of ecosystem service markets.
* Duke University, Nicholas School of the Environment.
** Department of City and Regional Planning, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill.
† Acknowledgments: We would like to thank Kathleen D. Oppenheimer for feedback and
assistance in editing this article. Funding for this work was provided by the UNC Institute
for the Environment and both Doyle and BenDor were visiting fellows at the Property
and Environment Research Center (PERC) while working on this project. This Article
represents an overview of our past and ongoing work on markets for freshwater services,
portions of which have been examined elsewhere, but which we here draw new conclusions
about current state and future possibilities.
1 See MILLENNIUM ECOSYSTEM ASSESSMENT, ECOSYSTEMS AND HUMAN WELL-BEING:
SYNTHESIS 26 (2005), available at http://www.millenniumassessment.org/documents
/document.356.aspx.pdf [hereinafter MEA] (stating that the “ecosystems and biomes that
have been most significantly altered globally by human activity include marine and fresh-
water ecosystems . . .”). See generally HEINZ CTR. FOR SCI., ECON. AND THE ENV’T, THE STATE
OF THE NATION’S ECOSYSTEMS 133–54 (2002) [hereinafter HEINZ] (examining the state of
fresh water ecosystems).
2 Peter M. Vitousek et al., Human Domination of Earth’s Ecosystems, 277 SCIENCE 494,
494–99 (1997), available at http://www.sciencemag.org/content/277/5325/494.full.
3 Margaret Palmer et al., Ecology for a Crowded Planet, 304 SCIENCE 1251, 1251–52 (2004).
4 See Elizabeth M. Strange et al., Sustaining Ecosystem Services in Human-Dominated
Watersheds: Biohydrology and Ecosystem Processes in the South Platte River Basin, 24 
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Ecosystems are often defined as the complex of (1) organisms
appearing together in a given area and (2) their associated abiotic envi-
ronment, which interact through energy fluxes in order to construct biotic
structures and material cycles.5 The study of ecosystems is somewhat dis-
tinct from that of the field of ecology in that ecosystem ecologists generally
study material or energy fluxes, while other ecologists commonly focus on
the behavior or patterns of particular organisms or groups of organisms.6
Additionally, ecosystem ecologists generally consider ecosystems to be land-
scape features (physical features in the natural environment) that have
the ability to produce various functions.7 Here, ecosystem functions are the
ability of a particular ecosystem (i.e., area) to change the flux or storage
of material or energy through time.8 These functions include photosyn-
thesis (carbon sequestration), nutrient uptake or retention, metabolism,
or any other process characterized by the entirety of the ecosystem feature
(physical expression of ecosystem) rather than the process of any particular
individual organism or species.9
“Ecosystem services” are derived from the beneficial outcomes of
ecosystem functions. These services provide the benefits that produce
ecological value.10 For example, streams and wetlands naturally function
as retainers of nitrogen;11 in watersheds in which there are nitrogen-
driven water quality problems (e.g., hypoxia of estuaries),12 nitrogen re-
tention would be considered a valuable ecosystem service. The Millennium
ENVTL. MGMT. 39, 50 (1999) (acknowledging that “there is increasing concern that sub-
stantial changes will be required to ensure sustainability of essential ecosystem services”).
5 See HEINZ, supra note 1, at 16 n.7.
6 TIMOTHY F.H. ALLEN & THOMAS W. HOEKSTRA, TOWARD A UNIFIED ECOLOGY 90–92 (1993).
7 See, e.g., Wolfgang Haber, Landscape Ecology as a Bridge from Ecosystems to Human
Ecology, 19 ECOLOGICAL RESEARCH 99, 104–05 (2004); Monica G. Turner, Landscape
Ecology: The Effect of Pattern on Process, 20 ANNUAL REVIEW OF ECOLOGY AND SYSTEMATICS
171, 173 (1989).
8 Turner, supra note 7, at 173.
9 Rudolf S. de Groot et al., A Typology for the Classification, Description, and Valuation
of Ecosystem Functions, Goods and Services, 41 ECOLOGICAL ECON. 393, 394–95 (2002),
available at http://www.afordablefutures.net/uploads/3/5/8/5/3585210/degroot_et_al.pdf.
10 See Gretchen C. Daily et al., Ecosystem Services: Benefits Supplied to Human Societies
by Natural Ecosystems, 2 ISSUES IN ECOLOGY 1, 1 (1997); Dennis M. King & Luke W.
Herbert, The Fungibility of Wetlands, NAT’L WETLANDS NEWSL., Sept. 1997, at 10–13
[hereinafter King & Herbert].
11 See Mats Jansson et al., Wetlands and Lakes as Nitrogen Traps, 23 AMBIO 320, 320
(1994).
12 ECOLOGICAL SOCIETY OF AMERICA, HYPOXIA, available at http://www.esa.org/education
/edupdfs/hypoxia.pdf.
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Ecosystem Assessment (“MEA”)13 groups ecosystem services into four
categories: provisioning services (e.g., providing food and water); regulat-
ing services (e.g., disease regulation); cultural services (e.g., recreation
opportunities); and supporting services (e.g., services necessary for the
production of other service types).14 The lists of potential ecosystem ser-
vices appear to increase with time, and Ruhl et al.’s The Law and Policy
of Ecosystem Services15 provides a useful review and synthesis.
Markets for these services are as difficult to define as functions and
services themselves.16 Perhaps the most reasonable definition is given by
Robertson, who defines ecosystem service markets as those markets that
trade commodities based on ecological assessment criteria, such as wet-
lands, rather than units of weight or volume, as is the case for the acid
rain program.17 However, the clarity of this definition begins to break
down as ecosystem service markets begin to interact, as in the case when
there are both wetland and water quality markets. As we will discuss in
Part III.C infra, there are instances in which markets attempt to trade in
weight or volume units whose values are estimated using ecological assess-
ment criteria (we describe this using the example of point-source to non-
point-source water quality trading).18 Given these complicating factors,
it is imperative in any discussion of ecosystem markets to understand a
range of different resource markets and trading structures. Substantial
differences in commodity units and methods of assessment introduce prob-
lems that confront researchers and practitioners who study and implement
different types of markets.19
13 See MEA, supra note 1.
14 Id. at vi.
15 See generally J.B. RUHL ET AL., THE LAW AND POLICY OF ECOSYSTEM SERVICES (2007).
16 See Pac. Nw. Research Station, Counting All That Matters: Recognizing the Value of
Ecosystem Services, 16 SCIENCE UPDATE 1, 1–4 (2008), available at http://www.fs.fed.us/pnw
/pubs/science-update-16.pdf (describing the infancy of the concept of ecosystem services).
17 Morgan M. Robertson, Emerging Markets in Ecosystem Services: Trends in a Decade of
Entrepreneurial Wetland Banking, 4 FRONTIERS IN ECOLOGY AND THE ENV’T 297, 297
(2006) [hereinafter Robertson 2006].
18 See generally CYNDI KAROLY, N.C. DIV. OF COASTAL MGMT., NC WETLAND ASSESSMENT
METHOD (NCWAM) (2009), available at http://www.nccoastaltraining.net/uploads/Documents 
/DWQ%20NCWAM%20PPT.pdf (providing an overview of the North Carolina Wetlands
Assessment Method); PAUL ADAMUS, HYDROGEOMORPHIC (HGM) ASSESSMENT GUIDEBOOK
FOR TIDAL WETLANDS OF THE OREGON COAST—PART 1: RAPID ASSESSMENT METHOD (2006),
available at http://www.oregon.gov/DSL/WETLAND/docs/tidal_HGM_pt1.pdf?ga=t (provid-
ing overview of the Oregon Rapid Assessment Method).
19 Morgan M. Robertson, Discovering Price in All the Wrong Places: Commodity Definition 
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There is rapidly growing interest and advocacy for using market
forces for regulating environmental quality, and this is perhaps most visibly
shown by the formation of the USDA Office of Ecosystem Services and
Markets.20 This enthusiasm needs to be more critically informed by care-
fully examining markets that have existed, and evolved, over the past few
decades. Wetlands and streams comprise the oldest ecosystem markets,
and continue to be the most active at the national scale.21 Ecosystem ser-
vice markets for wetlands and streams thus form one of the few empirical
bases for understanding the policies, guidelines, and operations of eco-
system service markets.
Nearly ten years ago, several studies began to explore the implica-
tions of different market structures as a means of protecting wetlands
and streams and enhancing ecosystem services.22 In the intervening
decade, a number of analyses have collected data on the actual geo-
graphic,23 economic,24 and social25 operation of these markets, in addition
to an emerging body of scientific work conducted at these sites.26 This
and Price Under Neoliberal Environmental Policy, 39 ANTIPODE 500, 506–07 (2007)
[hereinafter Robertson 2007].
20 See generally U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., OFFICE OF ENVTL. MKTS., http://www.fs.fed.us
/ecosystemservices/OEM/ (last visited Nov. 7, 2011).
21 See BECCA MADSEN ET AL., STATE OF BIODIVERSITY MARKETS REPORT: OFFSET AND
COMPENSATION PROGRAMS WORLDWIDE vii, 8–9, 11–14 (2010), available at http://www
.ecosystemmarketplace.com/documents/acrobat/sbdmr.pdf.
22 See GRETCHEN C. DAILY & KATHERINE ELLISON, THE NEW ECONOMY OF NATURE: THE
QUEST TO MAKE CONSERVATION PROFITABLE 16 (2002); Gretchen C. Daily et al., The Value
of Nature and the Nature of Value, 289 SCIENCE 395, 395 (2000); James Salzman & J.B.
Ruhl, Currencies and the Commodification of Environmental Law, 53 STAN. L. REV. 607,
607–09 (2000).
23 See Todd K. BenDor et al., Landscape Characteristics of a Stream and Wetland
Mitigation Banking Program, 19 ECOLOGICAL APPLICATIONS 2078, 2089 (2009), available
at http://dx.doi.org/10.1890/08-1803.1; P. Womble & M. Doyle, Setting Geographic Service
Areas for Compensatory Mitigation Banking, NAT’L WETLANDS NEWSL., Sept./Oct. 2010,
at 18.
24 See generally Robertson 2006, supra note 17; Morgan M. Robertson, Discovering Price
in All the Wrong Places: Commodity Definition and Price Under Neoliberal Environmental
Policy, 39 ANTIPODE 500, 500–26 (2007) [hereinafter Robertson 2007].
25 See Todd K. BenDor & Martin Doyle, Planning for Ecosystem Service Markets, 76 J. OF
THE AM. PLANNING ASS’N 59, 60–61, 69–70 (2010); Salzman & Ruhl, supra note 22, at
612–13 (noting that there is “universal accord over the contributions of clean water and
flood control to social welfare . . .”).
26 See special issue of the journal ECOLOGICAL APPLICATIONS focusing on stream and river
restoration quality; many sites were mitigation (i.e., ecosystem service market) sites.
Evaluating River Restoration, 21 ECOLOGICAL APPLICATIONS 1925–2015 (2011).
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paper seeks to explore these operational issues in markets for freshwater
ecosystems, which unlike many proposed, and still theoretical, markets
(e.g., markets for carbon, impervious surface,27 and trees28) are operational
at a wide scale.
In discussing wetlands and streams, we will focus our discussion
and examples on markets in North Carolina, since they have been active
for over a decade and have been the focus of several recent studies as well
as recent federal and state regulation revisions.29 Although the experience
of designing and implementing these markets meant successfully navigat-
ing certain policy and scientific problems, many others have been exposed
and are still in need of further study and remedy.30 In addition to fresh-
water ecosystem markets, we also look at habitat conservation banking,
an emerging market that presents a new set of opportunities and chal-
lenges which will likely interact with these existing markets in the future.31
We will describe the policies that created these markets, including those
crafted at the federal, state, and local level. We will also present a series of
summary statistics that provide a sense of scale of these markets. Finally,
we use these examples to point toward some of the potential limitations or
problems of these markets that merit considerable thought and research
attention as comparable markets proliferate.
27 See CLAIRE WELTY ET AL., FINAL REPORT: USING AN “IMPERVIOUS PERMIT” ALLOWANCE
SYSTEM TO REDUCE IMPERVIOUS SURFACE COVERAGE FOR ENVIRONMENTAL SUSTAINABILITY
(2005), available at http://cfpub.epa.gov/ncer_abstracts/index.cfm/fuseaction/display.abstract
Detail/abstract/7148/report/F (last visited Nov. 7, 2011).
28 See generally INT’L SOC’Y OF ARBORICULTURE, GUIDELINES FOR DEVELOPING AND
EVALUATING TREE ORDINANCES (2001), http://www.isa-arbor.com/education/resources/educ
_TreeOrdinanceGuidelines.pdf (search “mitigation”) (discussing how “tree ordinance develop-
ment can be integrated with an overall community tree program”).
29 See BenDor & Doyle, supra note 25 (“present[ing] a case study of the unique institu-
tional structure that oversees and regulates land development, highway construction, and
environmental restoration in North Carolina”); ECOSYSTEM ENHANCEMENT PROGRAM (EEP),
2003 MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT, available at http://www.nceep.net/images/Final
%20MOA.pdf [hereinafter EEP MOA] (establishing the EEP and “the procedures for pro-
viding compensatory mitigation through the [North Carolina Department of Environment
and Natural Resources] Ecosystem Enhancement Program (EEP) to offset impacts to waters
and wetlands due to activities authorized by Clean Water Act permits”).
30 See Dan Kane, EBX is Paid Twice for Wetlands Work, RALEIGH NEWS & OBSERVER,
Dec. 8, 2009, at A1 (explaining the “double-dipping” controversy of taxpayers apparently
paying twice for environmental clean-up in North Carolina).
31 See J.B. Ruhl et al., A Practical Guide to Habitat Conservation Banking Law and Policy,
20 NATURAL RES. & ENV’T 26, 26–27 (2005), available at http://www.law.fsu.edu/faculty
/profiles/ruhl/2005-HabitatBanking20NRESummer.pdf [hereinafter A Practical Guide to
Habitat Conservation Banking Law and Policy].
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I. ECOSYSTEM SERVICE MARKETS: DESCRIPTION AND REGULATION
A. The Origin of Wetland Markets
Ecosystem service markets are almost all in some way based on,
or similar to, wetland markets.32 Wetland regulation in the United States
is rooted in the U.S. Federal Water Pollution Control Act of 1972,33 and the
Clean Water Act amendments of 1977,34 which provide for the protection of
“waters of the United States” under the Interstate Commerce Clause of the
U.S. Constitution.35 Congress designated the Army Corps of Engineers
(“Corps”) to administer § 404 for waters of the United States with oversight
from the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”).36 Through judicial
interpretation, “waters of the United States” includes wetlands.37 Most
development activities that affect waters of the United States fall under
§ 404 of the Clean Water Act, and thus require a permit from the Corps.38
As part of the 404 program, the permittee must mitigate wetland damage,
a process through which they (a) avoid all possible impacts, (b) minimize
unavoidable impacts, and (c) provide compensatory mitigation of unavoid-
able impacts, i.e., create, restore, or preserve wetlands such that there is
no net loss of cumulative wetland ecosystem function.39
In the early years of this regulation (until the mid-1990s), com-
pensatory mitigation was usually performed on-site by the permittee (also
often called the “developer” or “impactor”), resulting in the creation or
restoration of numerous, small mitigation sites with limited ecological
32 See Deborah L. Mead, History and Theory: The Origin and Evolution of Conservation
Banking, in CONSERVATION AND BIODIVERSITY BANKING 9, 9–11 (N. Carroll et al. eds., 2008).
33 Federal Water Pollution Control Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86 Stat. 816 (1972),
codified as 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251–1263, 1265, 1281–1292, 1311–1326, 1328, 1341–1345, 1361–
1376 (2006).
34 Clean Water Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-217, 91 Stat. 1566 (1977), codified as 33 U.S.C.
§§ 1281a, 1294–1297 (2006).
35 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
36 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (2006); Palmer Hough & Morgan M. Robertson, Mitigation under
Section 404 of the Clean Water Act: Where it Comes From, What it Means, 17 WETLANDS
ECOLOGY & MGMT. 15, 15–16 (2007), available at http://www.springerlink.com/content
/ag615v755494325v/fulltext.pdf (describing how the Corps came to regulate wetlands
and streams).
37 Donn M. Downing et al., Navigating Through Clean Water Act Jurisdiction: A Legal
Review, 23 WETLANDS, 475, 476, 484 (2003).
38 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (2006).
39 See Hough & Robertson, supra note 36, at 15–16 (explaining the “history of three forms
of [wetland] mitigation: avoidance, minimization, and compensation”).
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value in comparison to existing reference, less disturbed wetlands.40 During
this period, regulations also began promoting off-site compensatory miti-
gation by permittees.41 Although this was thought to promote better miti-
gation, the ecological values of these compensation sites were also often
extremely low, and the permittee, often a private land developer or a
state department of transportation, did not want to be in the business of
ecological restoration.42
In response to slow § 404 permitting and high permittee-responsible
mitigation costs throughout the early 1990s, entrepreneurs and regulators
proposed creating large, consolidated areas of constructed wetlands, known
as “mitigation banks,” as pre-impact or advance mitigation.43 In conjunction
with entrepreneurial mitigation bankers, developers, and EPA staff, Corps
districts developed the regulatory guidance necessary to define, create, and
maintain markets for mitigation of wetlands by overseeing the banks and
the trades that occurred.44
Wetland mitigation banking allows private, third-party companies
to speculatively restore wetlands, which can then be sold as credits to de-
velopers who do not wish to perform their own compensatory mitigation
(Figure 1).45 In order for a mitigation bank to be created, and credits from
that bank sold, the mitigation banker must have the site approved by an
Interagency Review Team (“IRT”) which is made up of personnel from the
Corps, EPA, and other local or federal natural resource agencies (e.g., U.S.
National Marine Fisheries Service, U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, and
state departments of environmental conservation).46
40 R. Eugene Turner et al., Count it By Acre or Function: Mitigation Adds Up to Net Loss
of Wetlands, 23 NAT’L WETLANDS NEWSL., Nov./Dec. 2001, at 5, 6, 14.
41 NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, COMPENSATING FOR WETLAND LOSSES UNDER THE CLEAN
WATER ACT 67–69 (2001) [hereinafter NRC] (explaining that mitigation banks “provide
off-site mitigation” for permittees “who anticipate having a number of future permit appli-
cations or by third parties who develop wetland credits for sale to permittees needing to
provide compensatory mitigation”).
42 Todd BenDor & Martin Doyle, Markets for Freshwater Ecosystem Services, in WATER
MARKETS (D. Gardner & R. Simmons ed., forthcoming), available at http://www.perc.org
/files/Doyle%20BenDor%20fresh%20water%20markets.pdf [hereinafter Markets].
43 See Robertson 2006, supra note 17, at 297–98.
44 See Federal Guidance for the Establishment, Use and Operation of Mitigation Banks,
60 Fed. Reg. 58,605–58,614 (Nov. 28, 1995) [hereinafter Corps 1995].
45 Id. at 58,605.
46 Compensatory Mitigation for Losses of Aquatic Resources: Final Rule, 73 Fed. Reg.
19,594–19,705 (2008), 33 C.F.R. § 332 (2008) [hereinafter 2008 Compensatory Mitigation
Rule].
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Figure 1. Relationships between agencies, impactors (devel-
opers), and mitigation bankers in the originally conceived
structure of compensatory mitigation banking.47 Note that
once impactors have purchased compensatory mitigation
credits, the liability for mitigation site failure is transferred
from the impactor to the mitigation bank.48
A key requirement of mitigation banking is that wetlands should
be restored in advance of impacts.49 In less-developed regions of the United
States, however, mitigation bankers are unlikely to speculatively invest in
banks because it is doubtful that there will eventually be sufficient demand
for the created credits.50 Such markets are known as “thin” markets.51 This
lack of economic incentive to invest in mitigation banks has a feedback
47 2008 Compensatory Mitigation Rule, supra note 46.
48 2008 Compensatory Mitigation Rule, supra note 46, at § 332.3.
49 Corps 1995, supra note 44, at pt. B; 23 C.F.R. § 777.2 (2008).
50 See Salzman & Ruhl, supra note 22, at 666–67 (“[D]evelopers want to develop wetlands
where land is dear (urban) and wetland banks want to locate where land is cheap (rural).”).
51 Id. at 645–46.
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to development activities, as development activities become hindered or
slowed by the lack of available mitigation banks in a region, since devel-
opers cannot easily obtain a § 404 permit.52 Such lack of available advance
credits created the impetus for in-lieu fee (“ILF”) programs.53
ILF programs are run by government or non-profit entities that
collect fees from developers (in lieu of actual compensation) and then con-
solidate these fees over time to build the necessary capital to restore wet-
lands.54 Similar to mitigation banks, the obligation and associated liability
for providing compensatory mitigation under ILF programs is transferred
from the developer to the third-party mitigator.55 The primary difference
between ILF programs and mitigation banks is the time at which mitiga-
tion occurs relative to impacts; in banking, restoration is performed prior
to impacts, while ILF programs allow mitigation to be performed years
after impacts are permitted.56
To summarize, compensatory mitigation of wetlands can now take
place through three mechanisms: permittee-responsible mitigation, pur-
chase of credits from a mitigation bank, or purchase of credits through
an ILF. These and other rules for wetlands-related regulation under com-
pensatory mitigation were most recently summarized and formalized by
the Corps and EPA in 2008 through the published new regulations gov-
erning compensatory mitigation, Compensatory Mitigation for Losses of
Aquatic Resources.57
B. Emerging Markets for Streams
How, when, and which wetlands merit being considered waters of
the United States (and thus subject to federal jurisdiction via the Corps)
remains highly contested between land developers and regulatory agencies,
and there has been a string of mixed Supreme Court decisions addressing
52 See David Sunding & David Zilberman, The Economics of Environmental Regulation
by Licensing: An Assessment of Recent Changes to the Wetland Permitting Process, 42 NAT.
RESOURCES J. 59, 73–76 (2002).
53 ENVTL. LAW INST., THE STATUS AND CHARACTER OF IN-LIEU FEE MITIGATION IN THE
UNITED STATES (2006) [hereinafter ELI 2006].
54 Id. at 1–3; Jessica Wilkinson, In-lieu Fee Mitigation: Coming into Compliance with the
New Compensatory Mitigation Rule, 17 WETLANDS ECOLOGY & MGMT. 53, 67 (2009), avail-
able at http://www.springerlink.com/content/y5538766x2551382/fulltext.pdf.
55 See 2008 Compensatory Mitigation Rule, supra note 46, at 19,594.
56 See ELI 2006, supra note 53, at 1–6.
57 2008 Compensatory Mitigation Rule, supra note 46, at 19,594–19,596.
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this issue over the past twenty years.58 The recent Rapanos v. Carabell
case59 again raised the question of which waters in the United States
should be considered under the regulatory authority of the Corps, and
the Corps in part answered this question through the 2008 Compensatory
Mitigation Rule60 discussed in Part I.A supra. In contrast to wetlands,
streams, and rivers are more easily justified as “waters of the United
States” that can be regulated by federal power over interstate commerce.61
Although § 404 of the Clean Water Act is known generally as a “wetlands
rule,” streams and rivers also fall under its jurisdiction, specifically as a
category of a “difficult to replace” type of wetland.62 In the past, impacts to
streams were often either considered by the Corps to be impractical to com-
pensate, or compensation was performed using wetlands credits.63 Trading
stream impacts for wetland credits is called “out of kind” compensation,
since the resources traded are not of the same kind.64
More recently, the Corps has begun requiring in-kind compensation
for streams, thus increasing the market for stream ecosystems and stream
banking separate from wetland banking.65 Additionally, because streams
are a “difficult to replace resource,” stream impacts must be compensated
by stream restoration.66 This policy has created a demand for stream resto-
ration credits, and in response, entrepreneurs have created stream miti-
gation banks similar to those for wetlands.67 Stream mitigation banking
has adapted the wetland mitigation banking model to riverine systems,68
and while only recently becoming nationwide, stream markets have sur-
passed wetlands markets in the number of trades in some states, as in
the case of North Carolina described in Part II infra.69
58 See Downing, supra note 37 (examining the history of “navigable waters” as defined by
the courts).
59 See Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 716–17 (2006).
60 2008 Compensatory Mitigation Rule, supra note 46, at 19,595.
61 See Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 716–17.
62 2008 Compensatory Mitigation Rule, supra note 46, at 19,594–19,596.
63 See ENVTL. LAW INST., BANKS AND FEES: THE STATUS OF OFF-SITE WETLAND MITIGATION
IN THE UNITED STATES 7–10 (2002) [hereinafter ELI 2002].
64 See id. at 18.
65 2008 Compensatory Mitigation Rule, supra note 46, at 19,618 (explaining that
“compensation for difficult to replace resources . . . should be provided through in-kind
rehabilitation”); 33 C.F.R. § 323.3(b)(4).
66 See id.
67 Rebecca Lave et al., Why you Should Pay Attention to Stream Mitigation Banking, 26
ECOLOGICAL RESTORATION 287, 287–89 (2008).
68 Id. (explaining that “[s]tream mitigation banking is rapidly becoming a major driver of
the stream restoration industry”).
69 See also id. at 287.
2011] FRESHWATER ECOSYSTEM SERVICE MARKETS 163
C. Water Quality Services
The Clean Water Act provides for trading of credits for nitrogen
(“N”) and phosphorus (“P”),70 both of which are leading sources of pollu-
tion in the United States, particularly in the Mississippi River basin and
Gulf of Mexico,71 as well as in many Atlantic river basins, including the
Chesapeake Bay, and the Albemarle-Pamlico sound of North Carolina.72
Under the Clean Water Act, “point source” (“PS”) is distinguished from
“non-point source” (“NPS”) pollution: PS pollution is federally regulated
under the National Pollution Discharge Elimination System (“NPDES”),73
which is focused on discrete pollution emitters (e.g., wastewater treatment
facilities), and sets discharge limits and technology standards for point
sources.74 In contrast, NPS is regulated under total maximum daily load
(“TMDL”) requirements, which focus on ambient water quality in water-
sheds.75 Nationally, NPS pollution, particularly from agricultural sources,
comprises seventy-six percent of Nitrogen and fifty-six percent of Phos-
phorus reaching waterways.76 Although the EPA is responsible for NPDES
regulation, administration of the NPDES is typically delegated to state
agencies.77 Some states regulating NPDES have allowed water pollution
trading districts to form, specifically allowing the emergence of both point
source–to–point source (“PS-PS”) trading and point source–to–non-point
source (“PS-NPS”) trading programs.78
70 See 33 U.S.C. § 1267 (2006).
71 Richard B. Alexander, Effect of Stream Channel Size on the Delivery of Nitrogen to the
Gulf of Mexico, 403 NATURE 758, 758–61 (2000) [hereinafter Alexander] (discussing the
impacts of excessive nitrogen); see also EPA, WATER: NUTRIENTS: GULF OF MEXICO, avail-
able at http://water.epa.gov/scitech/swguidance/standards/criteria/nutrients/gulfofmexico
.cfm (discussing increase of phosphorus and nitrogen in the Mississippi River and Gulf
of Mexico).
72 See Water Quality Issues: Nitrogen and Phosphorus Pollution, CHESAPEAKE BAY
FOUND., http://www.cbf.org/page.aspx?pid=913 (last visited Nov. 7, 2011); U.S. DEPT. OF
THE INTERIOR, U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, WATER QUALITY IN THE ALBEMARLE-PAMLICO
DRAINAGE BASIN: NORTH CAROLINA AND VIRGINIA 1992–1995, available at http://pubs.usgs
.gov/circ/circ1157/circ1157.pdf.
73 See 33 U.S.C. § 1342(f) (2006).
74 See id. § 1342(k).
75 See id. § 1313.
76 RUHL ET AL., supra note 15, at 228.
77 See generally U.S. State Information, EPA, http://cfpub.epa.gov/npdes/stateinfo.cfm (last
visited Nov. 7, 2011) (explaining how the NPDES permit program is delegated to the states
by region).
78 See Richard T. Woodward & Ronald A. Kaiser, Market Structures for US Water Quality
Trading, 24 REV. OF AGRIC. ECON. 366, 373 (2003).
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Under the same theory driving atmospheric emissions trading
programs,79 PS-PS trades should allow PS polluters to come into compli-
ance more efficiently than if each polluter were required to come into com-
pliance individually.80 Moreover, because NPS can usually make reductions
in their pollution for relatively little cost (low marginal nutrient abatement
costs) compared to PS, PS-NPS trades should have even greater potential
than PS-PS trades to achieve regulatory compliance at reduced costs.81
While these markets have great potential for regulatory and economic
purposes, within the thirty-seven nutrient trading districts created, only
eight have conducted any trades, and only thirteen trades (one PS-NPS
trade) had occurred as of 2007.82
Water quality trading does not initially appear to qualify as an
ecosystem market since the commodity being traded is a chemical mea-
sured in pounds of N or P rather than an ecosystem service measured in
ecological assessment metrics.83 In the case of PS-NPS trading, NPS loads
are not measured directly, as they are for PS or in air quality markets.84
Rather, NPS pollution reductions arise through land use changes, spe-
cifically by landowners adopting best management practices (“BMPs”)
(e.g., riparian buffers and detention basins).85 Just as wetland area or
stream length serve as surrogate estimates of wetland or stream ecosys-
tem function, so land use change through BMPs is used as a surrogate
estimate of water quality change.86 Environmental management agencies
must develop ecological assessment techniques that provide conversion
factors linking land use, soil type, and other variables with their impacts
on water quality and nutrient (or other pollutant) loading. As a result, we
can consider NPS water quality trading programs to be operating ecosys-
tem service markets under the same definition used to articulate wetland
and stream markets.
79 James Boyd et al., Trading Cases, 217 ENVTL. SCI. & TECH. 216(A), 217 (2003).
80 See Woodward & Kaiser, supra note 78, at 373.
81 See Zoe Hamstead & Todd K. BenDor, Nutrient Trading for Enhanced Water Quality:
A Case Study of North Carolina’s Neuse River Compliance Association, 28 ENV’T AND
PLANNING 1 (2010).
82 RUHL ET AL., supra note 15, at 229.
83 See Robertson 2006, supra note 17, at 297.
84 See generally NPDES, EPA, http://cfpub.epa.gov/npdes/index.cfm (last visited Nov. 7,
2011) (explaining NPDES permits with respect to point sources).
85 Robertson 2007, supra note 24, at 506–07.
86 See id. at 501, 507.
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D. Habitat Conservation Banking
Habitat conservation banking is a recent development in ecosystem
service markets.87 Conservation banking occurs when habitat for a rec-
ognized (listed) threatened or endangered species is impacted and offset
with habitat preservation, enhancement, restoration, or creation at a dif-
ferent location.88 Conservation banking is a similar concept to wetland
and stream banking, whereby compensation is performed in one location
to offset similar impacts at multiple locations.89 The advantage of conser-
vation banking is that the conservation bank sites are often large, contig-
uous, and sited more strategically (to protect habitat) than impact sites.90
Like wetland banking, this can produce economies of scale leading to higher
quality restoration and ecological benefits not seen in small, fragmented
conservation areas.91
Conservation banking was first introduced in California by the U.S.
Fish and Wildlife Service (“FWS”) to distinguish banks developed specifi-
cally for federally listed endangered species from banks specifically desig-
nated for wetland mitigation.92 Unlike stream and wetland mitigation,
which now is subject to very specific federal regulation, conservation bank-
ing remains regulated by an FWS guidance document.93 Although this guid-
ance is comparable to early wetland/stream banking guidance documents,
the stated goal of conservation banking is to conserve species, which can
only be achieved through restoration or enhancement of the habitat needs
of that specific species.94 Thus, while habitat conservation banks operate
almost identically to wetland or stream mitigation banks, their evaluation
(by a review team similar to the Mitigation Bank Review Team (“MBRT”))
87 See A Practical Guide to Habitat Conservation Banking Law and Policy, supra note 31,
at 26–27 (explaining agencies’ belief that conservation banking is beneficial for species
as well).
88 See id. at 26.
89 See id. at 26–29.
90 Mead, supra note 32, at 17.
91 See Mark W. Schwartz, Choosing the Appropriate Scale of Reserves for Conservation,
20 ANN. REV. OF ECOLOGY AND SYSTEMATICS 83, 99–100; see also Todd K. BenDor & N.
Brozovic, Determinants of Spatial and Temporal Patterns in Compensatory Wetland
Mitigation Banking, 40 ENVTL. MGMT. 349, 361.
92 A Practical Guide to Habitat Conservation Banking Law and Policy, supra note 31, at 28.
93 See Memorandum from the U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, Guidance for The Establishment,
Use and Operation of Conservation Banks (May 2, 2003), available at http://www.usace
.army.mil/CECW/Documents/cecwo/reg/conserv_bank_guide.pdf.
94 See A Practical Guide to Habitat Conservation Banking Law and Policy, supra note 31.
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is held to species-specific criteria, rather than general criteria used to
evaluate wetlands and streams.95
Fisheries mitigation banks are perhaps the most relevant conser-
vation banks in the context of fresh water markets,96 although very few
trades have occurred.97 In two cases in California, over 100 acres were
restored to create the habitat specifically needed for a federally listed en-
dangered species.98 This area included tidal marsh habitat primarily ac-
quired as habitat for delta smelt, as well as Sacramento River floodplain
habitat for several fish species, including Chinook salmon.99 In contrast
to markets for wetlands, streams, and water quality, fisheries banks have
exhibited little market activity (trades) or research interest to date, but
we expect change as more regions experiment with implementing habitat
conservation banks.100
E. Some Regulatory Issues: Monitoring, Service Areas, and In-lieu
Fee Programs
There are several issues with current ecosystem market regulation
that require elaboration, particularly given the impacts that regulations
can have on promoting successful ecological and economic outcomes.101
First, regulations governing all of the markets that we have described
put very little emphasis on monitoring the ecological service actually being
traded.102 In wetlands mitigation, a range of services are considered to
be preserved, enhanced, and restored, including flood attenuation, nutri-
ent retention, and wildlife habitat.103 The only success criteria (denoting
a mitigation project as “successful”) measured in most Corps districts, how-
ever, relate to hydrology (water table elevation), soil type, and vegetation
95 See id. at 30.
96 See generally Tom Cannon & Howard Brown, Fish Banking, in CONSERVATION AND
BIODIVERSITY BANKING 159, 159–70 (N. Carroll et al. eds., 2008) (discussing the history
and potential future application of fish banks).
97 See id. at 163.
98 Id. at 159–60.
99 See id.
100 Id. at 163–64.
101 See Sunding & Zilberman, supra note 52, at 60–61 (analyzing the potential to reform
the most often issued wetland permit, National Wetland Permit 26).
102 In the case of stream mitigation in North Carolina, biological monitoring data from in-
stream communities are not required for any work, although they may be required on a case-
by-case basis. U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS–WILMINGTON DIST., STREAM MITIGATION
GUIDELINES (2003). To our knowledge, no monitoring of in-stream biological communities
has been required for mitigation permits to date.
103 See Salzman & Ruhl, supra note 22, at 612, 635.
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type/survival.104 While these are ecological components of wetlands, it is un-
clear whether these components are sufficient proxies to capture the range
of ecosystem services that regulations seek to protect under the auspices of
the Clean Water Act.105 Furthermore, while the 2008 federal mitigation reg-
ulation requires the establishment of more explicit standards defining eco-
logical success criteria,106 it does not explicitly define the range and type of
ecological functions and services that act as proxies for mitigation “success,”
leaving these to be determined by individual District Engineers.107
In the case of streams in many states, only physical characteristics
of stream channel shape—width, slope, and riparian vegetation—are mea-
sured or restored under compensatory mitigation.108 Although restoring
ecological functions (e.g., species recovery, nutrient retention) is the stated
purpose of compensatory stream mitigation, specific ecological aspects (e.g.,
community composition of fish or macroinvertebrates, nutrient retention)
are rarely monitored as a requirement for approval of the bank to sell its
credits.109 Evaluating the success of compensatory mitigation programs
is difficult because of this disconnect between the purpose of mitigation
(functional replacement) and the reality, as it is far from clear what is
being achieved when just the physical habitat is being changed.110
Recently published scientific literature is in fact casting doubts
on whether stream restoration can deliver demonstrable changes.111 Com-
monly assumed hydrological benefits of restoration, such as sediment
retention or flood attenuation, have been shown to be more difficult to
either restore or measure than previously thought.112 Biological changes
104 See NRC, supra note 41, at 35.
105 See Salzman & Ruhl, supra note 22, at 626 (explaining potential complications asso-
ciated with wetland mitigation).
106 2008 Compensatory Mitigation Rule, supra note 46, at § 332.5.
107 See 2008 Compensatory Mitigation Rule, supra note 46, at § 332.4(c).
108 See U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS–WILMINGTON DISTRICT, supra note 102, at 24–25.
109 In a review of several state regulations and Corps of Engineer Districts, we have found
a consistent pattern of requiring monitoring of physical variables (e.g., channel width, depth)
and riparian vegetation, but no in-channel biological data. For examples see U.S. ARMY
CORPS OF ENGINEERS–MOBILE DIST., COMPENSATORY STREAM MITIGATION STANDARD
OPERATION PROCEDURES AND GUIDELINES 31, 34 (Draft Edition, 2009); U.S. CORPS OF
ENGINEERS, STATE OF MISSOURI STREAM MITIGATION METHOD 11 (2007).
110 See infra notes 111–18 and accompanying text.
111 For limited effects of restoration on sediment loads see F. Douglas Shields, Do We
Know Enough About Controlling Sediment to Mitigate Damage to Stream Ecosystems?,
35 ECOLOGICAL ENG’G 1727, 1732 (2009). For limited effects of restoration on flood atten-
uation see Joel Sholtes & Martin Doyle, Effect of Channel Restoration on Flood Wave
Attenuation, 137 J. OF HYDRAULIC ENG’G 196 (2011).
112 See Shields, supra note 111, at 1730–32.
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are also proving difficult to demonstrate, as based on case studies or sys-
tematic reviews of many studies of fish and aquatic insect communities.113
There is ongoing scientific debate about the potential benefits of stream
restoration for nutrient retention, with some studies showing its efficacy,
and others its limitations.114 One limiting factor that has too often been
ignored is that background water quality may be so poor as to be both
toxic to aquatic organisms115 and saturating of any nutrient retention
effects;116 that is, in-stream water restoration may be moot given back
113 For fish studies, Phil Roni and his colleagues conducted a systematic meta-analysis
of published literature. See Phil Roni et al., Global Review of the Physical and Biological
Effectiveness of Stream Habitat Rehabilitation Techniques, 28 N. AM. J. OF FISHERIES
MGMT. 856 (2008) (noting that definitive conclusions on many techniques of stream re-
habilitation are difficult to make due to a lack of biological information); Ian A. Tattam
et al., Scale Pattern Analysis of Selected Scale Characteristics and the First Annulus for
Distinguishing Wild and Hatchery Steelhead in the Hood River, Oregon, 23 N. AM. J. OF
FISHERIES MGMT. 856 (2003); see also Ashley H. Moerke & Gary A. Lamberti, Responses in
Fish Community Structure to Restoration of Two Indiana Streams, 23 N. AM. J. OF FISHERIES
MGMT. 748 (2003); J.L. Pretty et al., River Rehabilitation and Fish Populations: Assessing
the Benefit of Instream Structures, 40 J. OF APPLIED ECOLOGY 251 (2003).
While a similar meta-analysis for insects is not available, case studies cast doubt
on stream restoration effectiveness. See S.S.C. Harrison et al., The Effect of Instream
Rehabilitation on Macroinvertebrates in Lowland Rivers, 41 J. OF APPLIED ECOLOGY 1140
(2004); David J. Price & Wesley J. Birge, Effectiveness of Stream Restoration Following
Highway Reconstruction Projects on Two Freshwater Streams in Kentucky, 25 ECOLOGICAL
ENG’G 73 (2005).
114 There are two main studies that show that stream restoration increases nutrient
retention. See Sujay S. Kaushal et al., Effects of Stream Restoration on Denitrification in
an Urbanizing Watershed, 18 ECOLOGICAL APPLICATIONS 789 (2008); Paul A. Bukaveckas,
Effects of Channel Restoration on Water Velocity, Transient Storage, and Nutrient Uptake
in a Channelized Stream, 41 ENVTL. SCI. AND TECH. 1570 (2007).
However, both have been interpreted incorrectly. For the Kaushal study, the effect
of restoration was measured on riparian zone denitrification, not in-stream processes. For
Bukaveckas, it is important to note that temperature in the stream increased dramati-
cally in the restored stream; thus denitrification increases are confounded by this effect,
not necessarily the in-stream restoration work. For studies showing the limitation of stream
restoration for nutrient retention see Todd V. Royer et al., Timing of Riverine Export of
Nitrate and Phosphorus from Agricultural Watersheds in Illinois: Implications for Reduc-
ing Nutrient Loading to the Mississippi River, 40 ENVTL. SCI. AND TECH. 4126, (2006);
Elizabeth B. Suddoth et al., Testing the Field of Dreams Hypothesis: Functional Responses
to Urbanization and Restoration in Stream Ecosystems, 21 ECOLOGICAL APPLICATIONS
1972 (2011).
115 See Julio A. Camargo & Alvaro Alonso, Ecological and Toxicological Effects of Inorganic
Nitrogen Pollution in Aquatic Ecosystems: A Global Assessment, 32 ENV’T INT’L 831
(2006); Julio A. Camargo et al., Nitrate Toxicity to Aquatic Animals: A Review with New
Data for Freshwater Invertebrates, 58 CHEMOSPHERE 1255 (2005).
116 See Stevan R. Earl et al., Nitrogen Saturation in Stream Ecosystems, 87 ECOLOGY 3140
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ground conditions. In response to criticisms of stream restoration, there
is often an argument that restoration projects need more time, although
historical studies have shown long-term ineffectiveness as well.117 Based
on these mixed results, scientists are suggesting that stream restoration
has limited effects on biological processes in comparison with the effects
of the broader watershed land use conditions, and thus site location rather
than project-specific design elements may be most important, although this
is an ongoing arena of active research.118
The second issue pertains to geographic “service areas,”119 which
is a key consideration in the economic and ecological success of an overall
ecosystem market.120 When wetlands or streams are destroyed, regulators
prefer the mitigation to be as close as possible to the impact, and if possible,
within the same watershed. The reasoning for this was articulated in the
first federal guidance on wetland mitigation, where regulators argued that
wetlands mitigated near impacts were more likely to provide similar eco-
system services.121 The area that any single mitigation bank can serve is
therefore limited to the same watershed (“service area”) as the impacts for
which it provides compensation.
However, the scale of these “watershed” service areas remains dif-
ficult to define explicitly, and the 2008 Compensatory Mitigation Rule has
been intentionally vague on this critical issue, essentially leaving it to each
Corps’ District Engineer to establish and enforce the scale they consider
most appropriate.122 If a service area is too large, then many impacts can
(2006) (discussing nitrogen saturation within streams, stemming from increased ter-
restrial use).
117 Douglas M. Thompson, Did the Pre-1980 Use of In-Stream Structures Improve Streams?
A Reanalysis of Historical Data, 16 ECOLOGICAL APPLICATIONS 784 (2006) (noting “growing
concerns about the long-term stability and environmental impact of instream structures”).
118 Christopher J. Walsh et al., Riverine Invertebrate Assemblages Are Degraded More
by Catchment Urbanization Than by Riparian Deforestation, 52 FRESHWATER BIOLOGY
574 (2007). But cf. W.M. Lewis & D.P. Morris, Toxicity of Nitrite to Fish: A Review, 115
TRANSACTIONS OF THE AM. FISHERIES SOCIETY 183 (1986); Aaron A. Moore & Margaret A.
Palmer, Invertebrate Biodiversity in Agricultural and Headwater Streams: Implications
for Conservation and Management, 15 ECOLOGICAL APPLICATIONS 1169 (2005).
119 Womble & Doyle, supra note 23; 2008 Compensatory Mitigation Rule, supra note 46,
at § 332.2.
120 See Robert Bonnie & David S. Wilcove, Ecological Considerations, in CONSERVATION
AND BIODIVERSITY BANKING 53, 53–67 (N. Carroll, et al. eds., 2008).
121 EPA & CORPS OF ENGINEERS, MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE EPA AND
THE DEPARTMENT OF ARMY CONCERNING THE DETERMINATION OF MITIGATION UNDER THE
CLEAN WATER ACT SECTION 404(B)(1) GUIDELINES (1990), available at http://water.epa.gov
/lawsregs/guidance/wetlands/mitigate.cfm.
122 See 2008 Compensatory Mitigation Rule, supra note 46, at § 332.3(c)(4).
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be concentrated in one geographic area, while all of the mitigation can be
geographically distant, leading to impact hot spots and localized net loss.123
If service areas are too narrowly constrained, then there is potentially in-
sufficient demand in any one area to justify taking on the economic risk
of a speculative mitigation bank, i.e., a bank residing in a thin market.124
Corps districts have not been consistent in defining the scale of
service areas, following on the devolution of responsibility in the Corps to
the District Engineer with whom authority resides for individual permit
decisions.125 The most common geographic service area used by Corps dis-
tricts is an eight-digit Hydrologic Unit Class (“HUC”); in a survey of com-
pensatory mitigation policies in 2010, twenty-five of thirty-eight Corps
districts used HUC-8 as their geographic service area size.126 Other Corps
districts define geographic service areas as agglomerations of eight-digit
watersheds, and still others allow trades across entire states.127 Still in
others, service areas are set as twenty or forty mile radii from the miti-
gation bank, within which impacts can be compensated.128 Other Corps
districts also included secondary service areas in which permittees could
purchase credits if no mitigation were available within the primary ser-
vice area.129 In many areas, where local regulations augment the Corps’
authority, these service areas are further constrained by political bound-
aries such as counties.130
Issues involving service area size differ across types of ecosystem
service markets: the goal of wetland and stream banking or water quality
trading programs such as PS-NPS programs is to sustain the quality of
local or receiving water bodies, and thus setting the geographic service
area at the watershed scale makes intuitive and regulatory sense.131 How-
ever, there may be cases where local mitigation is not ideal, and distant
mitigation is actually desired. For instance, the goal of conservation banks
is to preserve viable species populations.132 Moreover, one of the foremost
123 See Todd K. BenDor et al., Assessing the Socioeconomic Impacts of Wetland Mitigation
in the Chicago Region, 73 J. OF THE AM. PLAN. ASS’N 263, 276 (2007) [hereinafter Assessing
the Socioeconomic Impacts].
124 See Salzman & Ruhl, supra note 22, at 663, 666–67.
125 A significant number of provisions in the 2008 Federal Rule give the District Engineer
significant control over program implementation. See 33 C.F.R. §§ 325, 332 (2008).
126 Womble & Doyle, supra note 23, at 19.
127 Wilkinson, supra note 54, at 65.
128 Womble & Doyle, supra note 23, at 19.
129 Id.
130 See Robertson 2006, supra note 17, at 299 (highlighting restrictions in Illinois counties).
131 See NRC, supra note 41, 140–49.
132 See Mead, supra note 32, at 9.
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causes of habitat loss is urban and suburban development.133 Thus, it may
be entirely defensible or even preferable to allow the loss of habitat in a
rapidly developing region in exchange for mitigation in a distant region, if
the distant region is the best source of quality, long-term conservation land
or genetic conservation resources.134 That is, there are likely opportunities
in which giving up spatial proximity is justified in order to provide the most
ecologically beneficial restoration sites.135 Arguably, the inadequate success
to date136 of most ecosystem restoration suggests that there should be a bal-
ance between sites that are close but have limited restoration potential,
and sites that are further away that have greater restoration potential.
A third issue regards in-lieu fee programs.137 For traditional miti-
gation trading to occur, offsets (in the case of wetlands and streams, this
implies mitigation banks) must be at least partly established before new
impacts are permitted.138 “Advance” mitigation involves speculation on the
part of bankers who have limited information on the future of impacts in
a region or may have limited confidence in the stability of regulations that
govern banking.139 This uncertainty acts as a barrier to entry for bankers
into the mitigation credit market, causing situations in which insufficient
credits are available in an area to compensate for new impacts.140 ILF pro-
grams allow for potential impactors to pay a fee in lieu of actual mitigation,
essentially providing an ecological IOU program. It is questionable whether
ILF programs are ever appropriate, as they undermine both the economic
and ecological original intent of mitigation banking. Ecologically, banks are
meant to be established prior to impacts, thus reducing the time delay be-
tween impacts and an operational ecosystem.141 When using an ILF, there
is an inherent time delay between impacts and establishment of a compen-
sating ecosystem function, thus undermining an important component of
ecologically responsible mitigation.142
133 See EPA, WETLANDS: REPORT ON THE ENVIRONMENT DATABASE (March 10, 2011), avail-
able at http://cfpub.epa.gov/eroe/index.cfm?fuseaction=list.listBySubTopic&ch=47&s=202.
134 See Paul Armsworth et al., Land Market Feedbacks Can Undermine Biodiversity
Conservation, 103 PROCEEDINGS OF THE NAT’L ACAD. OF SCI. 5403, 5405–07 (2006).
135 See BenDor et al., supra note 23, at 18, 20.
136 See NRC, supra note 41, at 121–22.
137 Wilkinson, supra note 54, at 53 (analyzing potential improvements needed to ensure
the effectiveness of in-lieu fee programs).
138 See 2008 Compensatory Mitigation Rule, supra note 46.
139 See generally BenDor & Brozovic, supra note 91 (discussing factors, including regulation,
affecting distribution of banking sites).
140 See Robertson 2006, supra note 17, at 299–300.
141 Corps 1995, supra note 44, at 58,605.
142 Todd K. BenDor, A Dynamic Analysis of the Wetland Mitigation Process and its Effects
on No Net Loss Policy, 89 LANDSCAPE AND URBAN PLAN. 17, 18 (2009).
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Economically, ILF programs produce even more potential problems.
ILF programs accept fees from developers at a rate that is assumed will be
adequate to purchase and restore sites in the future and then assume all
responsibility and liability for providing those mitigation credits.143 ILF
programs could charge fees far in excess of restoration costs, thus holding
development projects hostage.144 As discussed in the North Carolina case
below,145 however, this is often not the case. ILF programs can (and often
do) in fact charge insufficient fees to offset increasing property and resto-
ration costs, which can quickly escalate beyond expectations.146 Moreover,
ILF programs can potentially underprice private mitigation banks operat-
ing in the same areas by undercutting the market price for compensation—
by collecting fees that are lower than those needed to actually build the
project.147 Because ILF programs are typically operated by public agen-
cies or non-profit groups, undercharging for ILF credits acts to subsidize
aquatic resource impacts from new public and private development by
charging impactors less than the full costs of compensation.148 That is,
ILF programs can place public investments in direct competition with
private enterprise.149
II. CHARACTERISTICS OF THE NORTH CAROLINA STREAM AND
WETLANDS MARKET
A. Policy Structure in North Carolina
In order to illustrate the operation of ecosystem service markets, we
will look more closely at a case study of the evolution of markets in North
Carolina, particularly focusing on policy structure and extent of market
activity. Stream and wetland mitigation banking in North Carolina is reg-
ulated by the North Carolina Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (“NCDENR”) and the Wilmington District of the Corps.150 One
143 ELI 2002, supra note 63, at 104, 107.
144 See id. at 107 (noting the DuPage County, Illinois program charged $175,000 per acre
in an area where mitigation banks charged around $50,000 per acre).
145 See infra Part II.B.
146 ELI 2002, supra note 63, at 107 (explaining that Pennsylvania ILF program does not
account for land value when determining the fee rate).
147 David T. Urban & John H. Ryan, A Lieu-Lieu Policy with Serious Shortcomings (Article 1),
21:4 NAT’L WETLANDS NEWSL., July/Aug., 1999, at 5, 9–10.
148 See id.
149 See id.
150 See generally N.C. GEN. ASSEMBLY, PROGRAM EVALUATION DIV., DEP’T OF ENV’T AND
NAT. RES. WETLAND MITIGATION CREDIT DETERMINATIONS, SPECIAL REPORT (April 29,
2010), available at http://www.ncga.state.nc.us/PED/Reports/documents/Wetlands/Wetland
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of the key characteristics of North Carolina land use and environmental
management has been the rapid spatial growth of several urban areas in
North Carolina.151 This rapid suburbanization, combined with the physi-
ography of the Eastern half of the state (topographically flat, humid, large
wetlands throughout), has led to significant impacts on streams and wet-
lands.152 Frequent impacts requiring permits have led to extensive demand
for wetlands and stream compensatory mitigation credits.153
In North Carolina, the largest impactor of aquatic resources is the
North Carolina Department of Transportation (“NCDOT”).154 During the
mid-1990s, NCDOT began to experience project delays due to insufficient
mitigation credits produced by private bankers.155 In response to this, the
state developed the Wetland Restoration Program in 1996, re-designated
as the Ecosystem Enhancement Program (“EEP”) in 2003. The EEP is a
state-administered wetlands and stream mitigation program that operates
as both an ILF program and mitigation bank (the history and documen-
tation establishing the policies and practices of the EEP are summarized
in the DYE REPORT).156 The EEP was intended to use projected NCDOT
construction projects as a platform from which to proactively develop miti-
gation credits well ahead of time in the needed geographic areas (similar to
a mitigation bank).157 In 1998, the Corps allowed EEP-generated mitigation
credits to also be purchased by private developers, effectively opening up
the market to a new type of credit consumer for which the EEP was allowed
to provide compensation (under an ILF program).158 Thus, within North
Carolina, the market for stream and wetland mitigation credits is (theo-
retically) made up of trades between private developers and commercial
banks, trades between the NCDOT and EEP, and trades between private
developers and the EEP (Figure 2). Moreover, while the EEP designs and
builds some of its “own” projects (through independent contractors), a major
source of wetland and streams credits is attained through reselling credits
_Presentation.pdf; U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS–WILMINGTON DISTRICT, http://www
.saw.usace.army.mil/ (last visited Nov. 7, 2011).
151 See REID EWING ET AL., MEASURING SPRAWL AND ITS IMPACTS 1 (2002).
152 See State Wetland Program Evaluation: Phase I, ENVTL. LAW INST., available at http://
www.elistore.org/reports_detail.asp?ID=11079&topic=Wetlands (last visited Nov. 7, 2011).
153 DYE MGMT. GROUP, STUDY OF THE MERGER OF ECOSYSTEM ENHANCEMENT PROGRAM
AND CLEAN WATER MANAGEMENT TRUST FUND, FINAL REPORT TO THE NORTH CAROLINA
GENERAL ASSEMBLY, RALEIGH, NC, at ES-1, 14–15 (2007) [hereinafter DYE REPORT].
154 BenDor & Doyle, supra note 25, at 67.
155 DYE REPORT, supra note 153, at ES-1, 2–3.
156 Id. at 20–29.
157 Id. at 53.
158 Id. at 20–22.
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from “full delivery” sites—sites purchased, designed, and built by private
mitigation bank firms.159 Thus, private mitigation banks can sell credits
to private developers, or they can develop sites specifically in response to
requests from the EEP.
Figure 2. Relationships between agencies, impactors, and
mitigation bankers in North Carolina in the presence of the
Ecosystem Enhancement Program. Prior to SL 2009-337,
private impactors could also pay a fee to the EEP in lieu of
purchasing mitigation credits from a bank.160
159 See generally N.C. ECOSYSTEM ENHANCEMENT PROGRAM, http://portal.ncdenr.org/web
/eep (last visited Nov. 7, 2011).
160 See EEP MOA, supra note 29, at 6–10.
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B. North Carolina Ecosystem Markets: Economics and Geography
The North Carolina EEP reveals some of the weaknesses inherent
in ILF programs. Templeton et al. conducted an economic study of EEP
projects for 2006 and 2007 and showed that while the EEP collected fees
of $232 per linear foot of stream mitigation, the inflation-adjusted expense
for all projects was $242 per linear foot.161 Moreover, this expense exceeded
any inflation-adjusted mitigation fee that EEP charged in previous fiscal
years.162 And Templeton et al. estimate that this is a conservative cost esti-
mate as the projects are likely to still require more costs due to monitoring
requirements.163 Given that the data set analyzed consisted of greater than
191,000 linear feet of stream, the EEP may have undercharged developers
by more than $1.9 million.164 Again, because the EEP is an ILF program,
the EEP remained responsible for providing these credits even though they
did not collect adequate fees (prices are set by the North Carolina General
Assembly).165 Presumably, the state of North Carolina provides the nec-
essary funds to fill the gap between costs and fees collected, i.e., the state
essentially provided more than $1.9 million in subsidies for environmental
degradation by land developers through the EEP.166
In addition to these economic analyses, BenDor et al. recently com-
pleted an analysis of the North Carolina stream and wetland markets and
demonstrated how ecosystem markets affect the locations of ecosystem
services throughout the landscape.167 Between 1998 and 2007, there were
715 transactions (trades) between 496 impact sites and 161 EEP compensa-
tion sites, with 369 involving regulated wetlands and 346 involving streams
(48%).168 Mitigation sites were spread across the state, while impact sites
were concentrated in rapidly developing urban areas (Figure 3). By specifi-
cally linking the geospatial coordinates of Corps-licensed impacts with the
161 SCOTT R. TEMPLETON ET AL., ESTIMATION AND ANALYSIS OF EXPENSES DURING DESIGN-
BID-BUILD PROJECTS FOR STREAM MITIGATION IN NORTH CAROLINA, CLEMSON UNIV. DEP’T
OF APPLIED ECON. AND STATISTICS RESEARCH REPORT RR08-01, 18–21 (2008) [hereinafter
TEMPLETON].
162 Id. at 18.
163 Id. at 19.
164 Id. at 27–28.
165 EEP Schedule of Fees, N.C. ECOSYSTEM ENHANCEMENT PROGRAM, http://portal.ncdenr
.org/web/eep/fee-schedules (last visited Nov. 7, 2011).
166 See TEMPLETON, supra note 161, at 18–21.
167 See Assessing the Socioeconomic Impacts, supra note 123, at 265–66.
168 Todd K. BenDor & Audrey Stewart, Land Use Planning and Social Equity in North
Carolina’s Compensatory Wetland and Stream Mitigation Programs, 47 ENVTL. MGMT.
239, 243 (2011).
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coordinates of EEP mitigation sites, BenDor and Stewart showed that miti-
gation transactions traded wetlands an average distance of 46.9 km be-
tween impact sites and mitigation (Figure 3).169 Also, impact sites drained,
on average, 144 km2 compared to 43 km2 at mitigation sites, meaning that
mitigation sites were located in streams that were, on average, smaller
than streams in impacted sites.170
Figure 3. EEP compensatory mitigation transactions in
North Carolina.171 Each arrow maps compensatory mitiga-
tion transactions, originating at a stream or wetland impact
site and terminating at the compensatory mitigation site.
BenDor et al. also showed that mitigation performed under the
EEP led to virtually no net loss of streams or wetlands at the eight-digit
watershed scale, the broadest goal of wetlands and stream regulation.172
However, there were several ecologically relevant effects: (1) defragmen-
tation, (2) movement upstream in the watersheds, and (3) loss of place-
specific functions. The first effect was a spatial defragmentation of streams
and wetlands, as numerous small impacts were mitigated at fewer, large
sites.173 While there are economies of scale for compensatory mitigation
169 See id. at 239 (averaging the distances between “impact and mitigation sites for streams
(43.53 km) and wetlands (50.3 km)”).
170 Markets, supra note 42.
171 See BenDor & Stewart, supra note 168, at 244.
172 Todd K. BenDor et al., Landscape Characteristics of a Stream and Wetland Mitigation
Banking Program, UNIV. OF N.C., at 17 http://www.unc.edu/~jsholtes/NCWRRI2008
_Presentation.pdf (last visited Nov. 7, 2011).
173 Bendor & Stewart, supra note 168, at 241.
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that drive the desire for large restoration sites,174 whether there are eco-
logical advantages of single large sites over several small sites is not at
all clear.175
Second, there was a preference to restore streams and wetlands
further upstream in the watershed rather than the impacts for which they
were compensating.176 While this is not surprising, as smaller upstream
sites are easier and cheaper to restore than large downstream sites, there
will be ecological communities and functions that are both gained and lost
through such market-induced pressures for upstream migration of restora-
tion sites.177 Third, there are place-specific functions that can be lost when
impacts are mitigated at restoration sites across the landscape. For in-
stance, when urban wetlands are destroyed and compensated by restoration
in remote rural areas, there is less potential benefit for retaining storm-
water runoff.178 Thus, there are location-specific benefits that may be par-
ticularly problematic to compensate under mitigation banking programs.
C. North Carolina PS-PS and PS-NPS Market Characteristics
The Division of Water Quality (“DWQ”) within the NCDENR is
responsible for administering water quality programs and regulations in
North Carolina.179 Also within NCDENR, the Environmental Management
Commission (“EMC”) creates water quality regulation within the Neuse
River basin.180 This 6192 square mile basin (Figure 4) contains a large por-
tion of the state’s population in the headwaters (Raleigh-Durham metro-
politan area; a significant source of PS pollution), while agricultural areas
dominate the lower watershed (corn and swine; significant sources of
NPS pollution).181 In 1998, the Neuse River basin adopted rules requiring
174 See BenDor & Brozovic, supra note 91, at 361.
175 See Schwartz, supra note 91 (explaining that conservation objectives have also been
met by small reserves).
176 See Assessing the Socioeconomic Impacts, supra note 123, at 263.
177 See Robin L. Vannote et al., The River Continuum Concept, 37 CAN. J. OF FISHERIES
& AQUATIC SCI. 130 (1980) (discussing the interrelationship between upstream and down-
stream communities).
178 See King & Herbert, supra note 10, at 12; Todd K. BenDor et al., The Social Impacts
of Wetland Mitigation Policies in the United States, 22 J. OF PLAN. LITERATURE 341, 342,
350 (2008).
179 About Division of Water Quality, N.C. DEP’T OF NATURAL RES., http://portal.ncdenr.org
/web/wq/home/about (last visited Nov. 7, 2011).
180 Neuse Nutrient Sensitive Waters Strategy, N.C. DIV. OF WATER QUALITY, http://h2o.enr
.state.nc.us/nps/neuse.htm (last visited Nov. 7, 2011).
181 General Information on the Neuse River Basin, NEUSE RIVER EDUC. TEAM, N.C. STATE
UNIV., http://www.neuse.ncsu.edu/geninfo.htm (last visited Nov. 7, 2011).
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a reduction in N (nitrogen) at the estuary to seventy percent of the
1991–1995 annual average by 2001.182 Under the rules, PS dischargers
who exceed their nitrogen discharge allocations are required to purchase
offsets from other PS emitters.183 The rules created an option for waste-
water dischargers to meet their N reduction goals collectively by forming
an association in which no individual members are fined as long as the
group as a whole is in compliance.184
Figure 4. Neuse River Compliance Association Map. NRCA
members are wastewater treatment plant operators who, as
a group, must comply with nitrogen reduction targets.185
Twenty-three wastewater dischargers formed the Neuse River
Compliance Association (“NRCA”) and the association was granted a basin-
wide NPDES permit.186 The permit allowed the association an N limit
182 See Hamstead & BenDor, supra note 81, at 6.
183 Neuse Nutrient Sensitive Waters Strategy, supra note 180, at Rule 0.0234 & 0.0240,
http://h2o.enr.state.nc.us/nps/neuse.htm (last visited Nov. 7, 2011).
184 Neuse Nutrient Sensitive Waters Strategy, supra note 180, Rule .0234, at pt. 9, http://
h2o.enr.state.nc.us/nps/2b-0234.pdf.
185 See Hamstead & BenDor, supra note 81, at 2.
186 NEUSE RIVER COMPLIANCE ASS’N, FACT SHEET—NPDES PERMIT NO. NCC000001, avail-
able at http://www.water.rutgers.edu/Projects/trading/00001nrcafactsheet_finalpermit.pdf.
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equivalent to the sum of the individual limits.187 By 2006, the NRCA had
reduced total N reaching the estuary by sixty-seven percent, far surpass-
ing their requirements.188 However, to date there have been no permanent
trades and only three temporary trades among members of the NRCA (i.e.,
year to year trades, or leases).189
Regulators have also been concerned about the potential creation of
N pollution hot spots because the Neuse rules only require N reductions in
the river’s estuary (see Figure 4); there is no regulation of in-stream water
quality.190 Over time, rapidly growing urban areas will need to purchase
greater N allotments from the agricultural areas downstream, where popu-
lation is not increasing as quickly.191 Upstream N loading from urban areas,
combined with a lack of in-stream water quality regulation, will likely pro-
duce a water quality hot spot in the more upstream reaches of the Neuse
River. While some of this nitrogen will be retained or removed from the
water by natural biogeochemical processes as it is transported downstream,
the levels of nitrogen that can be reached within these rivers can be quite
large, with potentially toxic or biogeochemically saturating effects.192
In addition to the NRCA, which is a PS-PS market, North Carolina
also allows PS-NPS trading.193 It is in this case that nitrogen trading be-
comes an ecosystem service market as we defined earlier.194 While the
units of trade in the PS-NPS market are in pounds of nitrogen, NPS re-
ductions are based on a land use classification that converts acres to pounds
of nitrogen retained per year.195 Specifically, buffer strips are constructed
187 See id. at 1–2.
188 NEUSE RIVER COMPLIANCE ASS’N, 2006 ANNUAL REPORT (2007).
189 Id.
190 See Neuse River Basinwide Water Quality Plan (1998), N.C. DIV. OF WATER QUALITY,
http://h2o.enr.state.nc.us/basinwide/Neuse/neuse_wq_management_plan.htm (last visited
Nov. 7, 2011).
191 See Emily S. Bernhardt et al., Understanding, Managing, and Minimizing Urban Impacts
on Surface Water Nitrogen Loading, 1134 ANNALS OF THE N.Y. ACAD. OF SCI. 61 (noting that
few cities have addressed infrastructure issues to ensure proper nitrogen disposal).
192 See Julio A. Camargo & Alvaro Alonso, Ecological and Toxicological Effects of Inorganic
Nitrogen Pollution in Aquatic Ecosystems: A Global Assessment, 32 ENVTL. INT’L 831 (2006)
(noting the consequences of increased nitrogen within rivers).
193 Water Quality Trading Program, RUTGERS WATER RES. PROGRAM, http://www.water
.rutgers.edu/Projects/trading/WQTrading.htm (last visited Nov. 7, 2011).
194 See Robertson 2006, supra note 17, at 297 (explaining ecosystem service markets).
195 RTI INT’L, A STUDY OF THE COSTS ASSOCIATED WITH PROVIDING NUTRIENT CONTROLS
THAT ARE ADEQUATE TO OFFSET POINT SOURCE AND NONPOINT SOURCE DISCHARGES OF
NITROGEN AND OTHER NUTRIENTS, FINAL REPORT (2007), available at http://www.nceep
.net/pages/Final_RTI_Report_Nutrient_Offset_June_2007.pdf.
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on riparian lands,196 and the area of buffer strips is converted into pounds
of nitrogen using a conversion factor.197 These nitrogen credits can be sold
to a PS emitter as an offset.198 In North Carolina, to our knowledge, the
first trade between private entities for PS-NPS occurred in 2008.199 Thus,
the state of the market remains unclear. Regardless, it is worth noting that
the PS-NPS market mixes a traditional environmental market, based on
pounds or volume, with a market based on complex ecological assessment
techniques (ecosystem service markets).200
III. ISSUES ON THE HORIZON
A. Science: Do Offsets from Compensatory Mitigation Work?
The critical question underlying all ecosystem service markets is
whether or not they work. That is, are restored ecosystems comparable
to predevelopment ecosystems? To date, there have been very few stud-
ies that have documented actual ecological success of stream restoration
projects,201 and the value and efficacy of wetland restoration continues
to be questionable.202
Emerging policies are placing greater emphasis on documenting
real ecological change rather than relying on indicators or surrogate vari-
ables, as has been the standard approach in the past.203 For instance, in
North Carolina, the Division of Water Quality in 2008 released its guid-
ance for stream restoration via dam removal, which required substantial
documentation of recovery of actual ecological functions (e.g., species and
water quality), as opposed to recovery of simple channel geometry, in order
to receive approval for the site from the MBRT as a compensation site.204
Presumably, more rigorous standards for data collection and monitoring
196 Lewis L. Osborne & David A. Kovacic, Riparian Vegetated Buffer Strips in Water Quality
Restoration and Stream Management, 29 FRESHWATER BIOLOGY 243, 245 (1993).
197 RTI INT’L, supra note 195, at 1–4.
198 N.C. ADMIN. CODE § 15A NCAC 2B.0240(a) (2006).
199 Personal Communication, Adam Riggsbee, Riverbank Ecosystems, Austin, Tex.
(Sep. 7, 2010).
200 Markets, supra note 42.
201 See Emily S. Bernhardt et al., Synthesizing U.S. River Restoration Efforts, 308 SCIENCE
636, 637 (2005).
202 See NRC, supra note 41, at 3.
203 See id. at 7.
204 U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS & EPA, DETERMINING APPROPRIATE COMPENSATORY
MITIGATION CREDIT FOR DAM REMOVAL PROJECTS IN NORTH CAROLINA 3–5 (2008), avail-
able at http://www.nceep.net/pages/Comp%20_Mitig%20_Credit_Dam_Removal_Proj%20
_NC_21308.pdf.
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will increase the care with which project sites are designed and, more im-
portantly, selected.205 Regardless of the specific monitoring required, we
expect that there will be greater emphasis on regulatory requirements for
empirically-based evaluation of restoration projects in the future, thereby
broadening the information available to guide future programs.206 Indeed,
the 2008 federal compensatory mitigation rule places much greater em-
phasis on documenting ecological effects of restoration as a part of future
compensatory mitigation practices.207
B. Policy: Geographic Service Areas and ILF Programs
One of the key considerations for any ecosystem service market is
the size of the geographic service area that can be served by a mitigation
bank.208 There has been great inconsistency in the application of service
areas to ecosystem markets, be they wetland, stream, or conservation
banks.209 For streams and wetlands, the 2008 compensatory mitigation
rule, while establishing a “watershed approach,” leaves the scale of the
market unspecified, and thus up to the interpretation and discretion of the
local District Engineer.210 Determining a bank’s service area has critically
important implications for the financial viability of individual banks, as
well as an ecosystem service market in general.211
ILF programs represent another major policy hurdle for the private
sector in future ecosystem markets. State regulators, departments of trans-
portation, and many private developers have argued that ILF programs
are vitally necessary to prevent development restrictions,212 and for provid-
ing compensation in geographic areas that do not generate sufficient im-
pacts (demand) necessary for a private banker to establish a bank.213 ILF
programs suffer from substantial problems, however, potentially leading
to insufficient and unsuccessful restoration, as well as the real potential
205 See id. at 16–17.
206 NRC, supra note 41, at 8–9.
207 2008 Compensatory Mitigation Rule, supra note 46, at § 332.5, § 332.6.
208 See supra Part I.E.
209 See generally Womble & Doyle, supra note 23, at 2078, 88–90 (analyzing spatial relation-
ships in stream and wetland impact and compensation sites).
210 See 2008 Compensatory Mitigation Rule, supra note 46, at § 332.3(c)(2).
211 See LEONARD SHABMAN, ET. AL, ENVTL. LAW INST., APPLYING LESSONS LEARNED FROM
WETLAND MITIGATION BANKING TO WATER QUALITY TRADING, 21 (2005), available at http://
www.eli.org/pdf/wqtforum/LanSiemStedShab05.pdf (noting that the ELI has identified
service area as a critical factor in determining the success of mitigation banks).
212 See id. at preamble.
213 Jack T. Chowning, In-Lieu-Fee Programs Belong Among Mitigation Options, 21 NAT’L
WETLANDS NEWSL., July/Aug., 1999, at 8–9 (1999).
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for creating artificially low or high prices.214 These factors combine to
create a system in which negative resource impacts from land development
can be essentially subsidized through the provision of artificially under-
priced restoration sites, as shown by the Templeton et al. study for North
Carolina.215 Moreover, many of these ILF restoration sites are completed
after impacts, in contrast to their private mitigation bank counterparts,
which are required to be (at least partly) completed and certified prior to
impacts.216 Thus, the advantages of ILF programs are, arguably, primarily
for developers.
We may now be seeing a distinct shift away from ILF programs,
at least in North Carolina. Perhaps the most damning political action in
North Carolina against ILF programs came after the 2008 state legislature
hearings on the EEP.217 During these hearings, an unusual coalition of
environmental groups, private restoration industry, and home builders all
lobbied against the state’s ILF program.218 The result was the unanimous
passage of Public Law 2008-152 (amended as Session Law 2009-337),219
“An act to promote compensatory mitigation by private mitigation banks.”220
This bill stipulates that non-NCDOT impactors must use credits from pri-
vate mitigation banks if those credits are available in the impacted area,
and that payment to the EEP ILF Program is only acceptable if no miti-
gation bank credits are available.221 A critically important aspect of this
outcome is that private mitigation banks will no longer have to compete
with the EEP in providing wetland or stream credits if the mitigation
banks have credits available.222
Unfortunately, the North Carolina mitigation bank act does not
address the fact that many areas in the state have no private mitigation
bank.223 Increasing the geographic service area of banks (Figure 5) is one
214 See TEMPLETON, supra note 161.
215 See generally id. (discussing North Carolina’s Ecosystem Enhancement Program for
financing mitigation projects).
216 See Corps 1995, supra note 44.
217 Ecosystem Enhancement Program: Hearings on N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-214.11 Before the
General Assembly of North Carolina, Sess. L. 2008-152, SB 1885 (2007).
218 Id.
219 See Ecosystem Enhancement Program: Compensatory Mitigation, Pub. L. No. 2008-152,
N.C. Sess. Law No. 2009-337.
220 Id.; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-214.11 (2009).
221 See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-214.11 (2009).
222 See id.
223 See Mitigation Banks in North Carolina, N.C. DIV. OF WATER QUALITY, http://portal
.ncdenr.org/web/wq/swp/ws/401/certsandpermits/mitigation (last visited Nov. 7, 2011)
(providing a list of all mitigation banks in North Carolina).
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way to provide compensatory mitigation to these areas without relying
on ILF programs. Increasing the service area would provide much greater
incentive for private bankers to develop their own sites, which would pro-
vide proactive restoration rather than reactive restoration, as is the case
in ILF programs. In addition, larger service areas would encourage large
restoration projects, as greater certainty in demand would likely lead
to greater willingness to invest in larger restoration projects to take ad-
vantage of economies of scale.224 Although we lack empirical evidence, our
ecological understanding of other systems and processes (e.g., island bio-
geography theory),225 leads us to suspect that large restoration sites are
ecologically superior to small ones. Finally, rather than having a discrete
banking area, regulators could leverage trading ratios based on the dis-
tance away from impacts.226 Banks that were far away from the impacts,
or in a different watershed (“low spatial quality” in Figure 5), would be
given higher ratios than those that were close.227 Large mitigation banks
would still be desirable to develop since the banker could be ensured that
there would be some demand somewhere in the market for their credits.
In sum, current regulations have sought to avoid the proximity
problem by implementing mitigation methods (such as ILF programs)
that allow mitigation to occur after impacts. Sacrificing the benefits of
advance timing of mitigation is presumably made up by the advantages of
geographic proximity. In North Carolina, the stated focus of the EEP has
centered on ensuring proximity of mitigation to impact sites, while eco-
logical success criteria receive reduced emphasis, and current guidelines
facilitate post-impact mitigation (“low temporal quality” in Figure 5) rather
than advance mitigation. This approach represents a systemic problem
with in-lieu fee programs around the United States,228 and has been jus-
tified by the argument that spatial proximity between impacts and miti-
gation sites is of paramount concern, i.e., spatial quality is preferred over
temporal quality (Figure 5).229 This reflects recommendations that stream
224 See TEMPLETON, supra note 161, at 19–20 (providing analysis of economies of scale in
stream restoration projects).
225 Schwartz, supra note 91, at 90–91.
226 See BenDor & Brozovic, supra note 91, at 361–62.
227 Markets, supra note 42.
228 See ELI 2006, supra note 53, at 45–46 (discussing remedial action provisions and
contingency funds).
229 See Philip Womble & Martin Doyle, Army Corps Needs to Examine Rationale for
Mitigation Territories, ECOSYSTEM MARKETPLACE, (March 18, 2011), http://www.ecosystem
marketplace.com/pages/dynamic/article.page.php?page_id=8136&section=news_articles
&eod=1.
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and wetland restoration consider “landscape position” and take a “water-
shed approach” as recommended by the NRC.230 However, the NRC review
of compensatory mitigation of wetlands throughout the United States also
noted that compensatory mitigation should preferably be established prior
to permitted impacts.231 Determining the extent to which spatial proximity,
timing, and mitigation project size affect project quality is a critical ques-
tion that will only be answered through case studies and landscape-scale
analysis of mitigation programs (Figure 5).
Figure 5. Conceptual model of tradeoffs in compensatory
mitigation programs among spatial proximity, timing, and
quality of restoration.232
C. Technical Limitations to Establishing Property Rights
Property rights are central to environmental trading as they spec-
ify who must pay whom to modify actions relating to the environment.
These rights also develop in response to changes in economic values, which
230 See NRC, supra note 41, at 4–5.
231 Id. at 61.
232 BenDor et al., supra note 23.
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stem from the development of new technology and the emergence of new
markets.233 Establishing property rights for ecosystem services is particu-
larly difficult because these services are based on ecological assessment
criteria rather than direct measurements of weight or volume (even though
these assessment criteria are then often used to convert into weight or
volume units).234 Establishing property rights for ecosystem services re-
quires sufficiently precise and accurate measurement of the quantity and
quality of the service.
In sulfur dioxide (“SO2”) emissions markets, actual SO2 is measured
at the smokestack.235 That is, the quantity of measurement is mass, and the
quality of measurement is precise to the unit being traded (tons of SO2).236
In this manner, it is like trading many other commodities for which the
unit of trade is precisely known and the quality of the commodity is mea-
sured directly (e.g., gasoline, corn, hogs, and nickel).237 In contrast to air
quality markets, ecosystem service markets are plagued with uncertainty.
For over two decades, the intent of wetland trading regulation has
been to ensure no net loss of the bundle of wetland ecosystem functions and
services in an area.238 Because of the difficulty in measuring the loss or res-
toration of functions at individual wetland sites, particularly small sites,
measures of wetland spatial extent (area) were deemed to be reasonable
surrogates for function.239 This enshrined the use of size as the primary
mechanism for seeking no net loss in wetland mitigation.240 Subsequent eco-
system service markets, such as streams and endangered species habitat,
have adopted similar approaches that establish functional no net loss as a
goal, but implement the regulation through size measures (e.g., length for
streams, species habitat area).241 Thus, the currency used to commodify
streams, wetlands, and habitat in ecosystem service markets is typically
related to size, rather than ecologically derived functional characteristics.
233 Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REV. 347, 350 (1967).
234 Robertson 2006, supra note 17, at 297–98.
235 Paul L. Joskow et al., The Market for Sulfur Dioxide Emissions, 80 AM. ECON. REV.
669, 670 (1998).
236 See id. at 670–71.
237 See id.
238 CONSERVATION FOUND., PROTECTING AMERICA’S WETLANDS: AN ACTION AGENDA, THE
FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL WETLANDS POLICY FORUM 18 (1988).
239 See J.C. WARD ET AL., MONITORING CHANGES IN WETLAND EXTENT: AN ENVIRONMENTAL
PERFORMANCE INDICATOR FOR WETLANDS 2 (1999) (identifying categories used to monitor
wetlands).
240 Markets, supra note 42.
241 See generally Salzman & Ruhl, supra note 22 (discussing environmental trading
“currencies”).
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Area can be measured precisely and quickly (some Corps require-
ments now require compensatory mitigation for impacts over 0.1 acres),242
but accurately or precisely quantifying measures of ecosystem quality is far
more difficult. In a stream or wetland market, critical questions remain
unanswered as to what specific functions must be present to determine
that the specific site is a “certifiable” ecosystem from which credits can
be drawn. In the case of PS-NPS trading, some land area (e.g., riparian
buffer) is converted from acres into pounds of nitrogen.243 A crucial yet
unresolved issue is whether the farmer’s actions installing a buffer strip
actually produce a measurable reduction in nitrogen loads downstream, or
whether the conversion of land itself is sufficient to generate water quality
credits.244 How should water quality improvements be verified? Changes in
the ecological quality of traded ecosystems changes how regulators choose
to monitor actions and enforce precise property rights.245 While monitoring
specific ecological functions has received increasing recognition in new
regulations,246 it remains an ongoing area of study for researchers.247
D. Economic Issues: Unbundling, Unstacking, and Double-Dipping
One of the critical issues, or opportunities, in the function of eco-
system markets is the potential for “credit stacking”—selling separate ser-
vices furnished by the same ecosystem in separate markets.248 For instance,
100 acres of a wetland bank are first sold as wetland mitigation units, and
then sold again as water quality credits, endangered species credits, or
even carbon credits. Credit stacking has also been called “unbundling,”
242 See U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS, CHICAGO DISTRICT, REGIONAL PERMIT PROGRAM
13 (2007), available at http://www.lrc.usace.army.mil/co-r/rppbrief.htm.
243 See RTI INT’L, supra note 195, at 8–11.
244 See Richard C. Schultz, Effectiveness of a Constructed Buffer Strip in Capturing Nitrogen
in the Midwestern Agricultural Landscape, U.S. GEOLOGIC SURVEY http://water.usgs.gov
/wrri/96grants/ncr15ia.htm (last updated March 23, 2005) (proposing to study the effective-
ness of buffer strips capturing nitrogen in an agricultural setting).
245 See generally CARY COGLIANESE & JENNIFER NASH, LEVERAGING THE PRIVATE SECTOR:
MANAGEMENT-BASED STRATEGIES FOR IMPROVING ENVIRONMENTAL PERFORMANCE (2004),
available at http://www.hks.harvard.edu/m-rcbg/research/rpp/reports/RPPREPORT6.pdf
(discussing management-based private/public strategies).
246 See 2008 Compensatory Mitigation Rule, supra note 46, at § 332.5.
247 See NRC, supra note 41 (“[E]valuat[ing] both the ecological performance of mitigation
projects and the institutions under which mitigation projects are conducted.”).
248 See generally WORLD RES. INST., WRI FACT SHEET: STACKING PAYMENTS FOR ECOSYSTEM
SERVICES 1 (2009) [hereinafter WRI].
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or “double-dipping,”249 although there are several distinctions between these
three concepts. Ecosystem service unbundling involves treating ecosystems
as a set of discrete services that are fully distinct and segregable from
one another.250 Credit stacking is the act of selling two or more ecosystem
services present on a single property as separate unbundled commodities,
compensating for different permitted impacts.251 Double-dipping is simi-
lar to stacking, except that credits are understood to “double up” natural
resource benefits.252
The distinction between stacking and double-dipping is an arena
of very unclear and unspecified policy. Fox argues that part of the dis-
tinction pertains to the additional activities that are necessary to gain the
additional credits.253 For example, if 200 acres of riparian buffer are estab-
lished specifically to sell as endangered species habitat credits, but are then
sold additionally into a market for NPS water quality credits, then Fox
argues that the banker would be guilty of double-dipping, because the
water quality credits were established separately on the same land with
no additional land management activities.254 To circumvent double-dipping,
Fox argues that the natural resource value accounting must be careful
and precise; it must clearly separate the riparian buffer needed for water
quality provision and that needed for salamander habitat provision, there-
by allowing these two areas to be sold separately.255 This approach relies
on the concept of “additionality,” the idea that the ecosystem services pro-
vided by an ecological restoration project are over and above the benefits
that would have been present without the project.256 However, the current
precision and accuracy of ecosystem service accounting is exceedingly low,
thereby causing potential barriers to establishing such closely coexisting
249 See Jessica Fox, Getting Two for One: Opportunities and Challenges in Credit Stacking,
in CONSERVATION AND BIODIVERSITY BANKING 171, 172 (N. Carroll et al. eds., 2008); J.B.
Ruhl, Mitigation: Stacking and Bundling and Bears, Oh My!, 32 NAT’L WETLANDS NEWSL.,
Jan./Feb. 2010, at 24.
250 For a discussion of unbundling, see John P. Hoehn, et al., Untying a Lancastrian Bundle:
Valuing Ecosystems and Ecosystem Services for Wetland Mitigation, 68 J. OF ENVTL. MGMT.
263, 263 (2003).
251 WRI, supra note 248, at 1–2.
252 See Fox, supra note 249, at 172.
253 See id. at 177 (describing “additionality” as “the approach that credits are awarded only
for those land management activities that occur above and beyond previous commitments”).
254 See id. at 174–176 (explaining the difference between double-dipping and stacking).
255 See id. at 172–77.
256 See id. at 177; Joyotee Smith & Sara J. Scherr, Capturing the Value of Forest Carbon
for Local Livelihoods, 31 WORLD DEV. 2143, 2150 (2003).
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ecosystem service markets.257 If regulators decide that double-dipping is
undesirable, then they would need to somehow limit certification of new
bank credits (for new markets) to those that are generated by additional
land improvements that would not have otherwise been achieved without
proactive measures.258
There are additional ecological and regulatory arguments against
credit stacking. Robertson and Mikota have argued that ecosystem functions
do not stack and unstack like Lego blocks, but rather are interrelated and
intertwined.259 One example involves nitrogen trading, where the only path-
way to permanent removal of nitrogen from water involves denitrification,
the conversion of nitrate (“NO3”) into gaseous nitrogen (“N2”).260 However,
the biogeochemical process of denitrification is limited by the availability
of carbon,261 thus inextricably linking carbon to nitrogen markets. Simi-
larly, even at the most simple biochemical level, carbon, nitrogen, and
phosphorus are intertwined through basic stoichiometry, making sepa-
rate water quality markets for these different nutrients scientifically non-
sensical.262 Moving into more complex ecological interactions, such as
the species interactions and food webs that are inherent to conservation
banks,263 will undoubtedly be substantially more complex. In the end, un-
bundling ecosystems as a concept is problematic to justify scientifically.
From a regulatory standpoint, it is clear that it is difficult to “un-
stack” ecosystem services derived from ecological restoration projects.264
There are multiple agencies that regulate ecosystem features and ecosys-
tem service markets: the Corps regulates streams and wetlands via the
Clean Water Act, while the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service regulates con-
servation habitat banks through the Endangered Species Act;265 state
257 E.g., U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, CORPS OF ENGINEERS DOES NOT HAVE
AN EFFECTIVE OVERSIGHT APPROACH TO ENSURE THAT COMPENSATORY MITIGATION IS
OCCURRING: REPORT TO THE RANKING DEMOCRATIC MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON TRANSPOR-
TATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES (2005).
258 See Fox, supra note 249, at 172.
259 See Morgan M. Robertson & Michael Mikota, Water Quality Trading and Wetland
Mitigation Banking: Different Problems, Different Paths?, 29 NAT’L WETLANDS NEWSL.,
Mar./Apr. 2007, at 14.
260 See Robert C. Starr & Robert W. Gillham, Denitrification and Organic Carbon
Availability in Two Aquifers, 31 GROUND WATER 934, 934–935 (1993).
261 See id. at 935.
262 See Wyatt Cross et al., Ecological Stoichiometry in Freshwater Benthic Systems: Recent
Progress and Perspectives, 50 FRESHWATER BIOLOGY 1895, 1896 (2005).
263 Kevin S. McCann, The Stability-Diversity Debate, 405 NATURE 228, 230 (2000).
264 See Robertson & Mikota, supra note 259, at 14.
265 See Mead, supra note 32, at 10, 14.
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agencies oversee water quality trading programs, and private organi-
zations oversee the currently voluntary carbon market.266 Thus, credit
stacking poses a substantial administrative hurdle for any banker who
wishes to engage multiple agencies simultaneously. At the most basic
level, unbundling or stacking credits makes unclear what actually changes
hands when credits are sold.267
When a wetland or stream credit is sold for compensatory mitiga-
tion, the banker has (1) inevitably sold a permanent easement to that prop-
erty, ensuring that the physical property will stay in its wetland/stream
natural condition; and (2) performed certain management actions that will
ensure the viability of the wetland or stream into the future.268 However,
the transaction has occurred to fulfill the legal requirements of § 404(b)
of the Clean Water Act.269 In the case of unstacking that same property into
water quality credits or endangered species credits, or even carbon credits,
the sale of these credits would be to fulfill a completely separate regulatory
requirement, such as the Endangered Species Act.270 Quite simply, the
legal status for stacking, unbundling, and double-dipping is unclear.
The policy way forward is unclear, or at least not set. At one
extreme, policymakers may acknowledge the functional integration of
ecosystems, perhaps by recognizing “ecological condition” as a single inte-
grating ecological function.271 Alternatively, policymakers may want to
embrace the unbundling approach through acknowledging that ecosystems
provide a wide range of services, and thus formulate regulations based
on precise valuations of these component services via separate markets
for each service.272
E. Markets: Unintended Consequences
Additional issues emerge in ecosystem service markets from the
nonintuitive interactions between ecosystem and market processes. To
date, we have insufficient data from which to derive empirical observations
about landscape scale ecosystem market behavior,273 but there are a few
modeling studies which provide some additional insight.
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267 See Robertson 2007, supra note 24, at 506–07.
268 2008 Compensatory Mitigation Rule, supra note 46, at § 332.7(a).
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272 See id.
273 See Martin W. Doyle & Andrew J. Yates, Stream Ecosystem Service Markets Under No-
Net-Loss Regulation, 69 ECOLOGICAL ECON. 820, 820 (2009).
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In the case of streams, Doyle and Yates linked an economic model
of free-entry equilibria with a simple ecological model in order to examine
the interactions of stream markets and ecological processes in programs
aimed at preventing resource net losses.274 Their modeling showed that
when implementing a no-net-loss program, a regulator must not only ac-
count for the ecological differences between restored and natural ecosys-
tems, but also consider the effect of market entry on the number and size
of restoration projects.275 They showed that in a system with little to no res-
toration scale economies, the number of entrants into an ecosystem service
market will be greater than the number that maximizes welfare.276 The
effect of this excess entry on restored ecosystems is to encourage the resto-
ration of smaller sites rather than larger sites, which are generally con-
sidered less ecologically desirable than larger sites.277 Thus, considerations
of joint processes are crucial when designing and evaluating such programs.
A similar conclusion was reached for a different type of ecosystem market
by Armsworth et al. who examined conservation banks within a system
that included real estate property market dynamics.278 They showed that
interaction between the local market for land and conservation purchases
could actually lead to a decrease in overall biodiversity.279 Conservation
purchases can affect land prices and potentially displace development to-
ward biologically valuable areas or accelerate the pace of development.280
While limited in number, emerging studies that link ecological
processes and characteristics with economic models suggest that these
coupled ecological-economic systems can produce unintended, or at least
nonintuitive, consequences.281 A critical need at this point in time is to
more fully explore these types of coupled systems.
CONCLUSION
Within freshwater ecosystems, ecosystem service markets now
span wetlands, streams, non-point source water quality, and habitat
274 Id. at 820–27.
275 See id. at 822.
276 See id. at 823.
277 See id. at 824.
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conservation.282 Most importantly, the regulatory framework for these
markets is very unstable, with major policy changes being the norm rather
than the exception.283 Moreover, under the auspices of compensatory
mitigation, the science and economics of ecological restoration is also in
its infancy.284
There are state and federal policies that can, if structured incor-
rectly, undermine many of the original intents of compensatory mitigation
programs (e.g., in-lieu fee programs).285 There are other policies that can
make private provision of compensatory mitigation difficult (e.g., small
geographic service areas).286 Resolving these tensions between the policies
developed for specific problems that emerge locally and the initial goals
of broad, federal environmental policy will inevitably remain an ongoing
problem inherent to this type of adaptive management. So long as scien-
tific monitoring can play a role in evaluating the programmatic success
for maintaining and restoring the integrity of the nation’s waters, then
we expect that ecosystem service markets can play an important role in
freshwater ecological restoration.
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